See tomorrow. Secure today.

From quantum vulnerabilities to migration, Quantsiv is your guide

A quantum computer could break the public keys widely used today.
Governments have published the dates for replacing them.
Finding them is the start. The migration is the work.

This is where we come in. Quantsiv walks you from the audit to a tested migration copy, hand in hand through each vulnerability, in your own CI. Every build shows the exposed cryptography and how long it stays exposed. Siv, the Quantsiv agent, drafts the changes. The harness tests the migration in a working copy of your code before anyone touches the real one.

Quantsiv is built for regulated-sector software dealing with cryptographic migrations. One migration at a time, in your own CI.

Why now

Harvest now, decrypt later, digital forge later and AI assistant prompt mistakes. Learn more

Two quantum threats

Harvest now, decrypt later

Today, hackers can intercept and store encrypted data, then decrypt it with sufficiently powerful quantum computers in the future. This puts today's encryption and key-exchange systems, such as RSA and Diffie-Hellman, at risk. It all depends on how long the data must stay secret. If it has to stay private for 25 years, traffic recorded yesterday is already at risk.

Digital signature forgery

Digital signatures make it possible to check that software, certificates, documents and transactions are genuine. A quantum computer could derive private keys from the public ones and forge signatures. Signatures must stay trustworthy, including those in devices, certificate authorities and permanent records. For crypto-asset wallets, a public key exposed on-chain could also make unauthorized transfers possible.

Error-prone AI agents

When AI agents generate code, they tend to fall back on patterns and defaults they already know. Those patterns often rely on vulnerable algorithms. AI assistant code can work correctly and pass its tests while still being exposed. In a controlled study, developers using an AI assistant wrote less secure code (Perry, Srivastava, Kumar and Boneh, ACM CCS 2023).

Today

Harvest

Encrypted traffic is intercepted, and data is copied and stored.

Tomorrow

Decrypt

Quantum computers break the public-key algorithms used to protect the stored copies.

Then

Exposure

Data encrypted with RSA or ECC becomes readable, and digital signatures can be forged.

The dates are already set

These are not just predictions. In the US and the EU, institutions have published guidance and requirements with set dates for replacing vulnerable cryptography.

  1. 13 August 2024

    NIST publishes the new standards

    The US standards institute publishes three new standards: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), to establish the keys used to encrypt data, and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), for digital signatures. Alternatives to today's algorithms are therefore available.

  2. November 2024

    NIST proposes deadlines for retiring today's algorithms

    In the initial public draft of NIST IR 8547, all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms, including P-256, are listed as disallowed after 2035.

  3. 22 June 2026

    Executive Order 14412

    The order addresses the risk known as “harvest now, decrypt later”. For high-value assets and high-impact systems, it sets 31 December 2030 as the deadline for post-quantum key establishment and 31 December 2031 for digital signatures.

  4. 24 June 2026

    OMB M-26-15: a phased federal migration

    The foundation of each agency’s plan is an inventory of its cryptographic assets, maintained through automated tools wherever possible, whose data “should populate a central Cryptographic Bill of Materials” (CBOM). Agency plans were due 120 days later, by 22 October 2026. The migration runs in five phases, from 2026 to 2035.

  5. October 2026

    NIST confirms the retirement dates

    The final NIST IR 8547 deprecates all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms after 2030 and disallows them after 2035: RSA and ECDSA signatures from 112 bits of security, EdDSA from 128 bits, and quantum-vulnerable key establishment. NIST recommends ML-KEM-768 as the default and names TLS an early priority for the migration. For a software team that is the transition roadmap: four years to the first date, hybrid key exchange and TLS first, signatures on their own clock.

  6. About December 2026

    A proposed rule for federal contractors

    EO 14412 gives the FAR Council 180 days, until about 19 December 2026, to propose a rule under the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). The rule would require covered contractors to comply by 31 December 2030 with NIST's FIPS standards, including those based on post-quantum algorithms.

  7. About March 2027

    Guidance on what a CBOM should contain

    Within 270 days of EO 14412, around March 2027, CISA, in coordination with NIST, is due to publish guidance on the minimum elements a CBOM should include.

  8. 2030 to 2035

    The migration deadlines

    Under EO 14412, post-quantum key establishment must be adopted by 31 December 2030, and digital signatures by 31 December 2031, on high-value assets and high-impact systems. If the FAR rule the order calls for is adopted, covered contractors must comply by 31 December 2030. Under the final NIST IR 8547 (October 2026), all quantum-vulnerable public-key algorithms are deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035. NSA CNSA 2.0 sets exclusive-use dates between 2030 and 2033, depending on the category. In the EU, the NIS Cooperation Group roadmap of 23 June 2025, a recommendation, asks member states to set national strategies by the end of 2026, address high-risk use cases by the end of 2030 and migrate as many systems as feasible by 2035.

Sources: EO 14412; EO 14412 in the Federal Register; OMB M-26-15; OMB M-23-02; NIST IR 8547 (October 2026) and its initial public draft (November 2024); CISA Post-Quantum Cryptography Initiative; NSA CNSA 2.0; NIST FIPS 203; EU NIS Cooperation Group roadmap.

How it works

An easy five-step process. Learn more

1. Audit

Quantsiv runs in your CI by default, so your code stays in your environment. It receives the CBOM and the finding details only if you choose to upload them, and scans public repositories on its own servers.*

2. Rank

Each finding goes on its own clock: encryption and key exchange by how long the data must stay secret, signatures by how long they must stay trusted. The most urgent come first.

3. Plan

For each finding, where the use is clear, Quantsiv names the standard to move to: ML-KEM, ML-DSA or SLH-DSA, with hybrid key exchange during the transition.

4. Document

Quantsiv generates a CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM, a SARIF file that works with code-analysis tools, and a report with the findings ranked by priority. Siv, the Quantsiv agent, uses this information to suggest quantum-safe alternatives and help plan the changes.

5. Migrate

Siv reads each finding in its context and drafts the change, on a model you choose, in your CI. The harness then tests the migration in a working copy of your code, with the tokens and signatures of the previous build still valid and the platform's prerequisites in place.

*Private repositories are not scanned externally.

One finding, from the audit to the tested change

Output*

example/billing-service branch main commit 1e94656 Scan complete Illustrative preview

Cryptographic inventory

Assets found
10
Quantum-vulnerable
9
Quantum-safe
1
Files scanned
8

Severity

  • Critical 4
  • High 5

Exposure

  • Harvest Now, Decrypt Later 4
  • Signature forgery 4
  • Use not classified 1

Findings

6 more assets
  • criticalECDH-256, key agreement web/src/card-vault.ts:3
  • highECDSA-256, certificate key certs/api.crt:1
  • highECDSA-256, key generation services/ledger/sign.go:12
  • highECDSA, signature services/ledger/sign.go:17
  • highRSA-3072, use not classified scripts/make-release-key.sh:3
  • safeX25519MLKEM768, hybrid key exchange deploy/nginx.conf:6

Finding: RSA-OAEP encryption

critical Harvest Now, Decrypt Later src/billing_export.py:10
Business context
Customer records must stay secret for 25 years (declared in the repository's quantsiv.yml)
Why it ranks here
Protects data that must stay confidential for 25 years.
The risk
RSA-based public-key cryptography is vulnerable to sufficiently capable quantum computers. Data intercepted today may become decryptable in the future if the relevant encryption or key-establishment mechanisms are compromised.
Move to
Replace RSA encryption/key transport with ML-KEM (FIPS 203) plus an AEAD.
Authority
EO 14412 (22 Jun 2026): post-quantum key establishment on high-value assets and high-impact systems by 31 Dec 2030. NIST IR 8547 (Oct 2026): quantum-vulnerable key establishment deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035.

Quantsiv AI: migration analysis

Analysis complete In your CI, on the model you choose Simulated output

The current implementation uses RSA-OAEP to protect exported customer records with a 25-year confidentiality requirement.

Not a drop-in swap. Here RSA-OAEP wraps the AES key that encrypts each export. ML-KEM does not encrypt a chosen key: it establishes a shared secret, and the data key is derived from it. AES-256-GCM keeps encrypting the records.

Recommended migration
  1. Review the existing RSA-OAEP encryption and key-management flow.
  2. Evaluate ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for post-quantum key establishment, including hybrid approaches where appropriate.
  3. Use an authenticated symmetric encryption scheme such as AES-GCM for payload encryption.
  4. Identify affected dependencies, integrations, certificates, and compatibility requirements.
  5. Prioritise the migration based on confidentiality lifetime and cryptographic exposure.
  6. Validate the updated implementation and run regression checks.
Priority
Critical, 25-year confidentiality
Affected
src/billing_export.py and the partner's decryption code, outside this repository
Standards
FIPS 203 (ML-KEM-768) for key establishment; AES-256-GCM for the records
Compatibility
The export format changes, and the partner needs an ML-KEM key pair. Exports already sent stay as they were.
Draft change
--- a/src/billing_export.py
+++ b/src/billing_export.py
@@ -4,10 +4,11 @@
 from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
 from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
-from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
 
 def seal_export(records, partner_key, export_id):
-    data_key = AESGCM.generate_key(bit_length=256)
-    wrapped_key = partner_key.encrypt(data_key, padding.OAEP(mgf=padding.MGF1(hashes.SHA256()), algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), label=None))
+    # Key establishment: ML-KEM-768 (FIPS 203); the records stay encrypted with AES-256-GCM
+    kem_ciphertext, shared_secret = partner_key.encapsulate()
+    data_key = HKDF(algorithm=hashes.SHA256(), length=32, salt=None, info=b"billing-export v2").derive(shared_secret)
     nonce = os.urandom(12)
     body = AESGCM(data_key).encrypt(nonce, json.dumps(records).encode(), export_id.encode())
-    return {"wrapped_key": wrapped_key, "nonce": nonce, "body": body}
+    return {"kem_ciphertext": kem_ciphertext, "nonce": nonce, "body": body}

Validation

Checks on the draft change
  • target is a post-quantum alternative: ML-KEM-768
  • rescanned: RSA is gone
  • nothing quantum-vulnerable added
  • policy passes

Real output of Quantsiv's checks for the draft above. Your own tests run too when you set a check command; this sample sets none. A person reviews the change, and nothing is committed.

On every later build

A later pull request adds an RSA key. The change check compares it with the latest main-branch build:

gate
fail
new asset
RSA-2048 at src/partner_upload.py:6, high

Finding: TLS key exchange groups

critical Harvest Now, Decrypt Later deploy/nginx.conf:6
Found
ssl_ecdh_curve X25519MLKEM768:X25519:prime256v1; X25519MLKEM768 is recorded as quantum-safe; X25519 and ECDH-256 (P-256) are not.
Business context
Customer records must stay secret for 25 years (declared in the repository's quantsiv.yml)
Why it ranks here
Protects data that must stay confidential for 25 years.
The risk
A client that cannot use the hybrid group falls back to a classical one. Traffic on those connections can be recorded today and decrypted later.
Move to
Migrate key establishment to ML-KEM (FIPS 203), deployed as a hybrid with X25519 (e.g. X25519MLKEM768 in TLS) during the transition.

Quantsiv AI: migration analysis

Analysis complete In your CI, on the model you choose Simulated output

The server already offers the hybrid group first, so the work is in the clients that cannot use it. A configuration file gets guidance, not a code change.

Recommended migration
  1. Find the clients that still negotiate X25519 or P-256, from the server's TLS logs.
  2. Upgrade or retire those clients, starting with the ones that carry customer records.
  3. Remove the classical groups from ssl_ecdh_curve once traffic allows.
  4. Probe the endpoint again to confirm that the hybrid group is negotiated.
Priority
Critical, 25-year confidentiality
Affected
deploy/nginx.conf and the clients of api.example.com
Standards
FIPS 203 (ML-KEM-768) in the hybrid X25519MLKEM768 group
Compatibility
Clients that support no remaining group cannot connect once the fallbacks are removed.

Validation

Checks on the guidance
  • target is a post-quantum alternative: X25519MLKEM768
  • no other classical algorithm named

Real output of Quantsiv's checks for the guidance above. Changes to configuration, keys, certificates and token formats get guidance, never a diff.

On every later build

A later pull request adds an RSA key. The change check compares it with the latest main-branch build:

gate
fail
new asset
RSA-2048 at src/partner_upload.py:6, high

Finding: JWT signing

high Signature forgery src/auth/session_tokens.py:6
Business context
Signatures must stay trusted for 10 years (declared in the repository's quantsiv.yml)
Why it ranks here
Signatures must stay trusted for 10 years; deadline 31 Dec 2031.
The risk
A quantum computer could derive the signing key from its public key and issue tokens that every service accepts. Nothing has to be recorded first: the public key is public by design.
Move to
Migrate to ML-DSA (FIPS 204) or SLH-DSA (FIPS 205). Prioritise long-lived signing keys: code/firmware signing, CA and token-issuer keys.
Authority
EO 14412 (22 Jun 2026): post-quantum digital signatures on high-value assets and high-impact systems by 31 Dec 2031. NIST IR 8547 (Oct 2026): quantum-vulnerable signatures deprecated after 2030 and disallowed after 2035.

Quantsiv AI: migration analysis

Analysis complete In your CI, on the model you choose Simulated output

These session tokens are signed with RS256, and other services verify them. Changing the algorithm changes the token format, so the agent gives guidance instead of a code change.

Recommended migration
  1. List every service and library that verifies these tokens.
  2. Confirm that each one can verify ML-DSA (FIPS 204) signatures before the issuer changes.
  3. Issue tokens with a new ML-DSA key, and accept both algorithms during the switch.
  4. Retire the RS256 key once no verifier depends on it.
Priority
High, signature deadline 31 Dec 2031
Affected
src/auth/session_tokens.py and every service that verifies the tokens
Standards
FIPS 204 (ML-DSA)
Compatibility
Tokens grow: an ML-DSA-65 signature is 3,309 bytes (FIPS 204), more than ten times an RS256 signature with a 2048-bit key. Check cookie and header size limits.

Validation

Checks on the guidance
  • target is a post-quantum alternative: ML-DSA-65
  • no other classical algorithm named

Real output of Quantsiv's checks for the guidance above. Changes to configuration, keys, certificates and token formats get guidance, never a diff.

On every later build

A later pull request adds an RSA key. The change check compares it with the latest main-branch build:

gate
fail
new asset
RSA-2048 at src/partner_upload.py:6, high

* Real Quantsiv results from a demo repository

Weeks, not years

The plan's first two years, in weeks in your CI. Learn more

The same migration, by hand and in your CI

The US federal plan and the EU roadmap run to 2035 (OMB M-26-15, 24 Jun 2026; EU NIS Cooperation Group roadmap, 23 Jun 2025), and NIST writes that such a migration can take 10 to 20 years (NIST IR 8547, October 2026).

By hand the US federal plan (OMB M-26-15), 2026 to 2035

  1. 2026 to 2027Strategy, planning and discovery
  2. 2027 to 2028Pilots and early migration
  3. 2028 to 2030Prioritised migration
  4. 2031Signature migration
  5. 2035Full migration

With Quantsiv the first weeks*, zoomed in: audit to migration copy

  1. Auditthe first build: a CBOM of what is there, each finding ranked on its own clock
  2. Siv draftseach finding read in context, a fix drafted where the target is clear
  3. The harness teststhe migration in a working copy of your code
  4. Migration copythe change tested, a pilot ready

Estimate* ยท inventory to pilottwo years by the plan, weeks in your CIover 90% shorter

*Estimate. The years are the US federal plan's phases (OMB M-26-15, 24 Jun 2026) and NIST IR 8547 (October 2026); the weeks are our estimate for the inventory, the ranking and a tested pilot, against the plan's two years for the same work, 2026 to 2028.

Under the hood

Built for the quantum era. Learn more

Support for many languages

Detects the most common cryptographic APIs in Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, Java, Kotlin, Go, C, C++, C# and Swift, plus openssl, ssh-keygen and keytool commands in build scripts.*

  • Python
  • JavaScript
  • TypeScript
  • Java
  • Kotlin
  • Go
  • C
  • C++
  • C#

Cryptographic inventory (CBOM)

Automatically creates a standard CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM or imports CBOMs generated by other tools.

Risk assessment

Ranks encryption by how long the data must stay secret, and digital signatures by how long they must be trusted. The most urgent issues are highlighted first.

Checks on every build

Automatically flags, on every build, the vulnerable cryptography a change introduces. Brings the checks into pull requests for early feedback.

Simple CI/CD integration

Works with GitHub Actions, GitLab, Jenkins and Azure DevOps. Run scans on your own computer or inside the pipeline you already use.

  • GitHub Actions
  • GitLab
  • Jenkins
  • Azure DevOps

Keys, certificates and TLS

Recognizes the algorithms and key sizes in key and certificate files, and probes the TLS connections of the servers you name with one handshake.

Infrastructure configuration

Finds vulnerable key and TLS settings in Terraform, Kubernetes, CloudFormation, web-server, OpenSSL and OpenSSH configuration in your repository.

Crypto wallet support

Finds secp256k1 and Ed25519 signing keys, Schnorr signatures, and ECDH and ECIES key exchange in common wallet libraries.

MCP support

Through a read-only MCP connector, lets AI coding assistants check your cryptography rules while they write code.

Post-quantum migration suggestions

Suggests the best-fitting standard: ML-KEM, ML-DSA or SLH-DSA, or a hybrid key exchange.

Siv, the Quantsiv agent

Siv. An AI agent able to analyze each finding in its context, proposing a fix. It connects to the model of your choosing through its chat-completions endpoint, for example ChatGPT, Claude, DeepSeek or Grok, or one you host yourself. No change is merged without the user's approval.

Migration testing

Our harness tries the whole migration in a working copy of your code, with Siv's drafts applied, without touching your checkout. The result travels in the CBOM and appears in the pull request comment.

*Coverage varies by language. Pattern matching misses aliased and dynamic calls and third-party code, and does not read cloud key-management services.

Roadmap

Four phases, one tailored journey. Learn more

Roadmap

All in one tailored journey, planned for the years ahead.

Phase 1 · Now → 2027

Audit

Show where each application uses cryptography, from inside its build.

In development

  • Migration testing for more stacks after Java services
  • Training the AI agent to learn from the changes the team approves
  • Post-quantum and hybrid cryptography
  • COBOL code on mainframes
  • CycloneDX 1.7
Phase 2 · 2027 → 2028

Migrate

Abstract your cryptographic migration end to end, one migration at a time: from the code to the keys, certificates and clients around it. Targets default to hybrid key exchange.

Phase 3 · 2028 → 2030

Agentic Crypto-Agility

Agents propose and check each other's work; deterministic checks; human approval.

Phase 4 · 2030 → 2035

Platform Consolidation

An all-in-one product to install, covering audit, migration and review.

Get in Touch

Get updates on post-quantum migration deadlines, standards, and Quantsiv releases.

hello@quantsiv.com

Privacy notice